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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BARBARA J E A N MADSEN, and 
B A R B A R A J E A N M A D S E N as 
Guardian ad Litem of D E B O R A H 
J E A N M O F F I T , a minor, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
Estate of E U G E N E T I F T O N 
M O F F I T , JR., Deceased, A R L E N E 
C. M O F F I T , and A R L E N E C. 
M O F F I T as Guardian ad Litem of 
M I C H A E L M O F F I T , a minor, and 
E Q U I T A B L E L I F E ASSURANC E 
S O C I E T Y O F T H E U N I T E D 
S T A T E S , a New York corporation, 
Defendants-A ppellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
S T A T E M E N T O F 
T H E N A T U R E O F T H E CASE 
Barbara Jean Madsen and Barbara Jean Madsen 
as Guardian ad Litem of Deborah Jean Moffit, a 
Case No. 
14027 
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minor, respond to an appeal made by the Appellants 
from a Summary Judgment which was granted in 
favor of the Respondents by the Third Judicial Dis-
trict Court, in and for the County of Salt Lake, State 
of Utah. This appeal is brought for the determination 
of the ownership of the proceeds of an insurance policy 
on the life of Eugene Tifton Moffit, J r . deceased, be-
tween his first wife and the minor child of that mar-
riage, and his second wife and the minor child of the 
second marriage. 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N T H E L O W E R COURT 
Respondents, Barbara Jean Madsen and Barbara 
Jean Madsen as Guardian d Litem of Deborah Jean 
Moffit, a minor, brought this action against Appellants 
and the Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United 
States to determine the ownership and right to receive 
the proceeds of Group Life Insurance Policy No. 
12560. After paying the policy proceeds into the Court, 
the insurance company was dismissed as a party. Ap-
pelants and Respondents filed motions for summary 
judgment based on the pleadings, attached exhibits and 
stipulation of the facts. After a hearing on the mo-
tions and memoranda of authorities submitted by both 
parties, the Court below granted the motion of Respon-
dents and denied the motion of Appellants. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek to affirm the judgment of the 
District Couit of the Third Judicial District in which 
summary judgment was granted in their favor as a 
matter of law. 
S T A T E M E N T O F T H E F A C T S 
Eugene Tifton Moffit, Jr. , the insured and now 
decedent in this matter, and Barbara Jean Madsen, 
Respondent, were married on December 23, 1955. Dur-
ing the course of that marriage, one child was born to 
the parties, Deborah Jean Moffit, on February 27, 
1957. During the course of the marriage, Mr. Moffit 
was employed by Mountain States Telephone and Tele-
graph Company (Mountain Bell), being hired by 
Mountain Bell on November 22, 1955, and continued 
to be employed there until the time of his death on 
July 16, 1974. Approximately two years after the mar-
riage of the parties, Eugene Tifton Moffit, Jr., en-
rolled with his employer, Mountain Bell, for certain in-
surance benefits through his employer's carrier, The 
Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States 
(Equitable). On January 15, 1958, Equitable agreed 
to insure the life of Eugene Tifton Moffit, Jr., under 
the terms of a Group Insurance Policy No. 12560. 
This group insurance policy which Mr. Moffit ob-
tained provided that the proceeds of said life insurance 
policy would be based to the nearest $1,000.00 of his 
3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
annual gross salary at the time of his death. Said policy 
provided for an escalation clause based on the variable 
amounts of the insured's wages paid him by his em-
ployer. The proceeds of said policy would be paid in 
accordance to the nearest $1,000.00 of the insured's 
salary at the time of his death, whether the wages be 
higher or lower than at the time of the enrollment in 
the insurance policy. 
Subsequently, on February 1, 1967, while still an 
employee of Mountain Bell and still married to Barbara 
Jean Madsen, Mr. Moffitt enrolled with Equitable for 
Supplementary Life Insurance for the group insurance 
policy he initially enrolled in on January 1, 1958. Said 
Supplementary Life Insurance Rider to the group in-
surance policy provided supplemental life insurance to 
his original policy in the same amount, again based on 
a proportionate sliding scale to the nearest $1,000.00 of 
his annual gross income at the time of his death. There-
after, the proceeds of the Group Insurance Policy No. 
12560 enrolled in by Mr. Moffitt with Equitable 
through his employer, Mountain Bell, amounted to 
twice his annual gross salary to the nearest $1,000.00. 
On December 7, 1967, the Respondent, Barbara 
Jean Madsen, and Eugene Tifton Moffit, Jr., the de-
cedent, were granted an interlocutory Decree of Divorce 
by the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, Civil No. 174352, which 
Decree of Divorce was final on March 6, 1968. The 
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Decree of Divorce incorporated a Proper ty Settlement 
Stipulation in which the Respondent. Barbara Jean 
Madsen, and Eugene Tifton Moffit. J r . . the decedent, 
executed on U< foher 13, 1967. On page 2, paragraph 3 
of the Stipulation, there uere made certain provisions 
I '- the designation <«f beneficiaries under the group 
insurance policy ,V-. l : *M». \» 1 id **ead as follows: 
*3. J ir* and agrees 
to mu j.- ran ; : , . ^ «ii,* . r^xt the life in-
surance he presently maintains through group 
coverage in connection with his employment for 
the benefit of plaintiff and the minor child, and 
in addition, to maintain health and accident in-
surance through such group coverage for the 
benefit of the minor dniigrH'. v <t;" I he parties." 
On December •; «>• , !he date the I Mvorce Decree 
was entered, Eugene iV'lcn Moffit, J the decedent. 
''»•*"' employed by Mountain Hell and \* as still enrolled 
-.•!. his Group Insurance Policy A* 12/WJO and the 
Supplemental Insurance Rider with the Imputable Life 
Assurance Society of the United States. \ t the dale 
of the Divorce Decree, -!u ndi^; . InTi ui the parties 
Deborah Jean Moffit, was ten years old 
un ^ iarch 6, 1968, the inteiioci i tory Decree of 
Divorce between the Respondent, Barbara J ean Mad-
sen, and the decedent, Kaigene Tifton Moffit, J r . , was 
final. Approximately two months after the divorce was 
final, on Ma\ 28, IJMiH, Ilic decedent -HI AHkm (.. 
Mnffil were married ,M i Moffit c.*ni»Iin = ^ d his employ-
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ment with Mountain Bell, and on June 11, 1968, he 
executed a change of beneficiary on his Group Life 
Insurance Policy No. 12560 and the Supplemental In-
surance Rider, changing the beneficiaries from Barbara 
Jean Moffit, the Respondent, who is now known as 
Barbara Jean Madsen, to that of Arlene C. Moffit, 
his then present wife. 
Eugene Tifton Moffit, Jr., the decedent, died in-
testate on July 16, 1974. At the time of his death he 
was married to Arlene C. Moffit and had been in the 
continuous employment of Mountain Bell since Novem-
ber 22, 1955 until the date of his death. Group Insur-
ance Policy No. 12560 of Equitable Life Insurance 
Society of the United States and the Supplemental 
Rider to the policy were still in force and fully main-
tained on the date of his death, and the named bene-
ficiary under said Policy and Rider was Arlene C. Mof-
fit. At the date of Mr. Moffit's death, his annual gross 
salary was $16,500.00, and under the terms of the in-
surance policy referred to above, the nearest $1,000.00 
amount would be $17,000.00. With the supplemental 
insurance rider, the total proceeds from the insurance 
policy maintained by the decedent would be the amount 
of $34,000.00. At the time of decedent's death, the 
minor child of the marriage between Barbara Jean Mad-
sen and the decedent, Deborah Jean Moffit, was a minor, 
being seventeen years of age. 
Upon the death of Eugene Tifton Moffit, Jr. , 
6 
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Mountain Bell paid a discretionary death benefit to the 
decedent's wife, Arlene C. Moffit, in the amount of his 
annual gross salary, which at that time was $16,500.00. 
Said death benefit was paid without consideration of 
the insurance policy which is the subject of this contro-
versy. 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
T H E I N S U R A N C E P R O V I S I O N O F T H E 
DIVORCE D E C R E E S H O U L D B E E N F O R C -
E D AS I T IS S T A T E D W I T H O U T L I M I T A -
T I O N A N D M O D I F I C A T I O N B Y T H E 
COURT. 
The Appellants have asserted that the provisions 
relating to life insurance in the Property Settlement 
Stipulation in the Divorce Decree of the decedent and 
Barbara Jean Madsen should be subject to reinterpreta-
tion, modification and limitation by this Court. In sup-
port of this theory, they state the basic rules of law 
supporting the fact that the Court must support the 
intentions of the contracting parties to the Property 
Settlement Stipulation. The Appellants argument is 
made under what appears to be a tacit understanding 
that the intention of the contracting parties is not clear 
from the Property Settlement Stipulation, and there-
7 
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fore they suggest to the Cour several interpretations 
that might or should be made by the Court. 
The Respondents would assert that the intention of 
the parties is clear and unambiguous by virtue of the 
writing in the Property Settlement Stipulation which 
was subsequently incorporated into the Decree of Di-
vorce by the District Court. That provision plainly 
states that the decedent was to maintain life insurance 
through his employment for the benefit of the Respon-
dent, the minor child. I t did not say that it was only in 
support of an obligation for child support and is bind-
ing only so long as the child support payments are due 
and payable. Again, it did not say that the intention of 
the parties was that the insurance policy was maintained 
to provide additional child support payments other than 
those required in the Divorce Decree. I t is the position 
of the Respondents that the contractual obligation en-
tered into between the decedent and Respondent was 
straight forward, clear and unambiguous. 
The obligation that the decedent voluntarily entered 
into was that of providing life insurance coverage 
through his place of employment on behalf of Respon-
dent, Deborah Jean Moffit, without limitation as to 
length of time or in connection with or in support of 
any other provision of the Property Settlement Stipula-
tion. The policy was clearly identified and remained 
the same policy during the entire tenure of the decedent 
with Mountain Bell, Equitable Group Policy No. 12560. 
s 
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The policy was not designated or limited to a mone-
tary amount, because the parties realized it could not 
be as the policy benefits were subject to variation by 
the very nature of the terms of the policy itself. The 
parties treated the insurance policy just like the other 
aspects of the property awarded to the Respondent. The 
Appellant, Arlene C. Moffit, neither contributed to the 
maintenance of said policy or to the child support of 
the minor child Respondent. Additionally, the Divorce 
Court did not order this provision in its own right, but 
merely incorporated the voluntary provisions of the 
Property Settlement Stipulation contracted by the 
parties. This precautionary measure taken by the parties 
to protect the minor child proved to be well founded 
as at the time of the decedent's death, Deborah Jean 
Moffit was still a minor and in need of the sustenance 
that the policy would provide. 
In this instance, the decedent and the Respondent, 
Barbara Jean Madsen, entered into a Property Settle-
ment Stipulation prior to a Decree of Divorce volun-
tarily and with the purpose of dividing their property 
and providing for child support and the care and main-
tenance of the minor child of their marriage. This was 
done and the Court incorporated the Property Settle-
ment Stipulation which included the insurance provision 
clause. This contractual obligation entered into by both 
the decedent and Respondent, Barbara Jean Madsen, 
was done so voluntarily by both parties. The strength 
of that Stipulation is two-fold. Not only is the Stipula-
9 
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tion binding as a contractual obligation between the 
parties which was subsequently breached by the dece-
dent, but also it has the added strength of a contractual 
obligation that is incorporated into a Court order. Aside 
from the sanctity of the contractual obligation and the 
binding authority it has upon the decedent, this Court 
has stated in Travelers Insurance Company v. Lewis, 
Utah 2d .., 531 P.2d 484 (1975), Page 485, 
the following: 
". . . There is ample authority to sustain the rul-
ing of the trial Court in holding that the provis-
ions of a Divorce Decree control the disposition 
of the proceeds of an insurance policy between 
contending beneficiaries. 
Therefore, there is ample authority for the parties to 
contractually obligate each other as to certain terms and 
conditions, and it is further strengthened by a provision 
that the Court incorporated it into a Decree of Divorce. 
Although the Appellant has used the principles set 
up by this Court in Murphy v. Moyle, 17 Utah 113, 
53 P . 1010 (1898), and that the same principle which 
is reaffirmed in Columbo v. Walker Bank <§ Trust 
Company, 26 Ut. 2d 350, 489 P.2d 998 (1971), it is 
the Respondents position that the Columbo case is fac-
tually distinguishable from the case before the Court 
at this time. Secondly, the guiding principles of Co-
lumbo, supra, which notes the flexibility of Section 30-
3-5, Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended (1973), 
10 
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would be more helpful for the Respondent in the case 
at hand before the Court than it would be for the Ap-
pellant. On page 1000 in the first full paragraph, the 
Court states as follows: 
". . . This Court in Murphy v. Moyle took an 
intermediate position which comports with the 
extremely flexible standards of the Statute (Sec. 
30-3-5), i.e., whether the payment of support con-
tinues after the death of the father depends upon 
the nature and terms of the Decree of Divorce/' 
(emphasis added) 
In the Colombo case, the Appellant was trying to 
deduct from the estate of the decedent the remainder of 
the child support payments which would be owed to him 
through the remainder of his minority. The Court 
denied that factor due to the surrounding circumstances 
and facts of the Divorce Decree in which the Appellant 
received rather substantial sums of money and property 
through the normal inheritance-heir relationship with 
the decedent. Although it is the Respondents' position 
that the Columbo case is distinguished factually from 
the case at hand should the Court find that the guiding 
principle of Columbo would apply here, the Respondent 
makes the following points. Based upon the nature and 
terms of the Decree of Divorce, we find the Respondent, 
Deborah Jean Moffit, was seventeen years of age at 
the time of her father's death. Her father, the decedent 
Eugene Tifton Moffit, Jr., died intestate with no ap-
preciable assets in his estate. Deborah Jean Moffit re-
11 
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ceived absolutely nothing from her father's estate by 
way of inheritance, benefits or appreciation. Contrary 
to the Columbo case, the Repsondent, Deborah Jean 
Moffit, received no property, no other life inusrance 
policies other than that which is contested in this action, 
and no division of the estate of her father inasmuch as 
the decedent's estate is appreciably without assets. On 
the other hand in this instant case, one of the Appellants, 
Arlene C. Moffit, received a discretionary death bene-
fit from the employer of the decedent in the amount of 
$16,500.00. 
Under the terms of the Columbo argument, if it 
applies to this case, we believe the facts indicate that 
decedent would have an obligation to provide for his 
minor daughter and where he entered into a contractual 
obligation to do so, which was affirmed by the Divorce 
Decree, that the intentions of the parties are clear that 
the insurance proceeds were to be provided for the minor 
child and that that obligation can be contracted for and 
can be enforced by the Courts beyond the death of the 
decedent. 
Appellant makes further argument contending that 
the Divorce Court cannot award any of the father's 
property to the children beyond that which he is obli-
gated to provide for their support. As support for this 
contention they cite Laws v. Laws, (Colo. 1967), 432 
P.2d 632. In that case the Colorado Trial Court re-
quired in the Divorce Decree for the provision of hav-
12 
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ing a life insurance policy on behalf of the minor chil-
dren of the parties. That case is factually distinguish-
able from the case at hand before the Court in the fol-
lowing particulars. 
1. The Colorado decision was based upon the Color-
ado Statutes/C.R.S. 1963, 46-1-5 (3), which reads as 
follows: 
(3) "The Court shall have the power to require 
security to be given to insure enforcement of its 
orders, in addition to other methods of enforcing 
Court orders now or hereafter prescribed by Sta-
tute o by Rules of Civil Procedure." 
The above statute which is the foundation of Laws 
V. Laws, supra, severely limits the Court as to the type 
of action that the Court can take and that is only as to 
"security" to insure the enforcement of it's order. 
2. In the above Colorado decision, the defendant 
and insured was forced by the Court involuntarily to 
maintain life insurance policies on behalf of the minor 
children of the marriage. That is not the case at hand 
wherein Eugene Tifton Moffit, Jr. , voluntarily con-
tracted in a Property Settlement Stipulation to main-
tain Deborah Jean Moffit as a beneficiary under his 
life insurance policy. The Court then merely incorpor-
ated that voluntary contractual agreement into the Di-
vorce Decree. 
3. The jurisdiction of the District Court in the 
13 
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State of Utah is based upon Section 30-3-5, supra, which 
provides greater flexibility and latitude than the Col-
orado statute did in Laws v. Laws. 
"30-3-5 U.C.A. D I S P O S I T I O N O F P R O P -
E R T Y A N D C H I L D R E N . When a Decree 
of Divorce is made, the Court may make such 
orders in relation to the children, property and 
parties, and the maintenance of the parties and 
children as may be equitable. The Court shall 
have continuing jurisdiction to make such subse-
quent changes or new orders with respect to the 
support and maintenance of the parties, the cus-
tody of the children and their support and main-
tenance, or the distribution of the property as 
shall be reasonable and necessary." 
The distinction between the Colorado statutes and 
the appropriate Utah statute and the factual circum-
stances surrounding Laws v. Laws, supra, and the case 
before the Court at this time are too far at variance to 
be controlling. 
The Appellant also cites Dixon v. Dixon, 121 Utah 
259, 240 P.2d 1211 (1952) as controlling the Court in 
it's interpretation of the case at hand. I t would be the 
position of the Respondent that again the facts distin-
guish Dixon v. Dixon, supra, from the case at hand in 
view of the fact the defendant was required by the Court 
to have insurance policies to protect his indebtedness to 
the Plaintiff in regard to certain title aspects of real 
property involved in the divorce. Although there are 
other issues involved in Dixon, we believe the most dis-
14 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
tinguishing factor here is that the lower Court required 
that an insurance policy be maintained to secure the 
debts, whereas in the case at hand the parties voluntarily 
entered into a Stipulation for the provision of insurance 
for the minor child. No mention is made here in the 
Property Settlement Stipulation or in the Decree of 
Divorce that said insurance policy was to be made for 
the protection of the child support payments or for any 
other obligation of the decedent to the minor child or to 
the first wife. 
Respondent would assert that the provisions of the 
Property Settlement Stipulation entered into by the 
parties should be enforced as it is written by the parties, 
in view of the fact that the parties voluntarily entered 
into that contractual obligation, and the Court ratified 
that voluntary contract in the Divorce Decree. Inas-
much as the decedent violated that contractual obligation 
and Court order, this Court should require that the pro-
ceeds of the insurance policy should go to the Respond-
ents. As the Court has the jurisdiction and authority 
to order the same, and the nature and terms of the 
Decree are not adverse to one another, and without the 
same the Respondent, Deborah Jean Moffit, would re-
ceive nothing by way of an inheritance, legacy or asset 
from the decedent, her father. Additionally, the question 
that is brought up in this aspect of the Appellant's argu-
ment has been settled by this Court in Travelers v. 
Lewis, supra, and that the question has been met and 
answered in favor of the Respondents. 
15 
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P O I N T I I 
R E S P O N D E N T S A R E E N T I T L E D TO 
T H E F U L L P R O C E E D S O F T H E INSUR-
A N C E P O L I C Y I N C L U D I N G T H E I N C R E A S -
E D A M O U N T F R O M T H E D A T E O F D I -
VORCE AS T H E I N C R E A S E I S I N ACCORD-
A N C E W I T H T H E P O L I C Y P R O V I S I O N S 
A N D W A S C O N T E M P L A T E D B Y T H E CON-
T R A C T I N G P A R T I E S A N D T H E COURT 
D E C R E E . 
The Appellants in this case assert that since the in-
surance policy maintained by the decedent since the 
divorce from the Respondent, Barbara Jean Madsen, 
has increased from the date of the divorce of December 
7, 1967, until the death of the decedent, Eugene Tifton 
Moffitt, Jr., on July 16, 1974, that the Respondent 
should be precluded from any of the proceeds of that 
increase in the insurance policy. The argument might 
have validity had the amount of the insurance policy 
been fixed at the time of the divorce and that the parties 
neither contemplated nor expected any after acquired 
property and that there was no "expectancy" of any 
unusual or predictable increase in the proceeds of that 
insurance policy. However, that is not the case here. 
The parties entered into their contractual obligations 
under their Property Settlement Stipulation which was 
incorporated into the Decree of Divorce, utilizing the 
insurance policy currently then in force by the decedent 
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with his employer, Mountain Bell. That policy was on 
December 6, 1967, and was from the date of it's initial 
enrollment on January 1, 1958, the same identical group 
term insurance policy with an escalation clause which 
provided that the proceeds of said life insurance policy 
would be based to the nearest $1,000.00 of the annual 
gross salary of the insured at the time of his death. I t 
is noted in the designation in the Property Settlement 
Stipulation under paragraph 3 that the clause refers to 
"the insurance policy maintained by the decedent with 
his employer". The description makes no mention as to 
a set dollar amount of the policy. This fact is extremely 
significant. The reason that the parties could not desig-
nate a fixed or set amount on the policy at the time of 
the divorce was because it was contemplated by the 
parties and understood by them at that time that the 
amount of the insurance policy would vary according 
to the decedent's annual salary at the time of his death. 
Therefore, Respondents are entitled to the proceeds 
of that policy at the time of the death rather than the 
amount of the policy at the time of the divorce because 
the policy provision provided for an escalation clause 
with a variable amount of the proceeds to be paid at 
the time of the death of the insured. The parties who 
entered into that contractual relationship fully under-
stood that this was what the policy provided and this 
factor was contemplated by the parties when they 
entered into that contract, which was later incorporated 
into the Decree of Divorce by the Court. 
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The Respondent is aware of the general rule of law 
in regard to beneficiaries under life insurance policies 
which is basically that the interest of a beneficiary is 
not ordinarily a "vested right", but is a mere "expect-
ancy" of an inchoate gift, which may be consummated 
upon the death of the insured, but which is revocable at 
the option of the insured during his lifetime. Jensen v. 
Eddy, 30 U2d 154, 514 P2d, 1142 (1973); Wentworth 
v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United 
States, (Utah 1925) 238 P . 648; Wawman v. Citizens 
National Trust and Savings Bank of Los Angeles, 
(C.A. 1954) 266 P2d 48; Reliance Life Insurance Co. 
of Pittsbhrg v. Jaffee, (Cal. 1953) 263 P2d 82. 
However, in the case at hand, the insured entered 
into a contract whereby he contracts as to who shall be 
the beneficiary of the life insurance policy, he thereby 
waives his right to change the beneficiarv under the life 
insurance policy and converts the "expectancy interest" 
of the beneficiary into a vested "equitable interest" in 
the life insurance policy. Even if at a subsequent date 
the insured was to change the beneficiary under the life 
insurance policy, the prior named beneficiary who was 
the subject of the contract would have a prior right over 
any subsequent named benef iciaiy. 
The above cited rule of law is cited very strongly 
by a number of Courts who have faced this problem 
which is directly in point with this case at hand and be-
fore the Court at this time. The District Court of Ap-
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peals in California in Waocman v. Citizens National 
Trust and Savings Bank of Los Angeles, supra, indi-
cated in a case which is factually in point where the 
parties entered into a property settlement agreement 
prior to a divorce wherein certain life insurance policies 
were to have the parties children named as beneficiaries. 
Subsequent to the divorce decree and property settle-
ment agreement, the father of the children altered the 
beneficiary under the terms of his insurance policy. Al-
though the Court found that the father did not substan-
tially change the beneficiary under the insurance policy, 
the Court strongly supported the above rule of law 
wherein it stated on page 50 the following: 
"An insured by contract may waive the right to 
change a beneficiary and may convert what is 
usually the contingent interest of a beneficiary 
of a policy of life insurance to a vested equitable 
interest. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Franck, 9 Cal. 
App. 2d 528, 534, 50 P2d 480; Mahony v. 
Crocker, 58 Cal. App. 2d 196, 202, 136 P2d 810. 
An agreement by an insured, in consideration of 
the settlement of property rights by which he 
covenants to make his daughter the sole heir and 
irrevocable beneficiary of a policy of life insur-
ance, vested with an equitable interest therein 
which may not be defeated without her con-
sen t . . . " 
Other jurisdictions and Courts have again upheld 
this rule of law in cases that are factually in point with 
the case before the Court. Reliance Life Insurance 
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Company of Pittsburg v. J of fee, et d, (Cal. 1953) 263 
P2d 82, stated on page 84 the following: 
"The interest of a beneficiary in a policy which 
authorizes an alteration of its terms is not ordin-
arily a vested right. On the contrary, it is a mere 
expectance of an inchoate gift which may be 
consummated upon the death of the insured. 
However, it is revocable at the option of the in-
sured during his lifetime. Mutual Life Ins, Co. 
v. Franch, 9 Cal. App. 2d 528, 537, 50 P2d 480. 
But the latter may waive his right to change 
beneficiary and by contracting may convert the 
contingent interest into a vested equitable interest 
in the policy which may not be subsequently de-
feated by an effort to change the beneficiary. 
ChilwelVv. Chilwell, 40 Cal. App. 2d 550, 553, 
105 P2d 122; Schoudy v. Schoudy, 55 Cal. App. 
344, 351 203 P2d 433." 
The basic rule of law which has been quoted in 
Waocman v. Citizens National, supra, and Reliance Life 
Ins. v. Jaffe, supra, is supported in cases of similar fac-
tual situations in the following jurisdictions and cases. 
Mahony v. Crocker, et al, (Cal, 1943) 136 P2d 810; 
Tivis v. Hulfey, 148 Kan. 892, 84 P2d 862 (1938); 
Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York v. 
Franck, et al, (Cal., 1935) 50 P2d 480; Ferro v. Bol-
ogna, 334 N.Y.S .2d 856, 31 N.Y. 2d 30, 286 N.E . 
2d 244 (1972). 
As to the issue of the after acquired property or 
the "expectancy" of the increased value of the insurance 
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I 
policy referred to in this case which is a result of the 
escalation clause dependent upon the variable amount 
of the decedent, Eugene Tifton Moffit, Jr. 's, salary, it 
is the position of the Respodent that the increased 
amount should be in fact a "vested equitable interest" in 
the life insurance policy. That position is supported by 
several jurisdictions. The California Court of Appeals 
in Bernice H. Burg art v. Elizabeth M. Burgart, 5 Cal. 
App. 3d 409, 85 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1970), a case that 
has similar facts as to the case before the Court at 
the present time. The issue as to the increased valu-
ation of the insurane policy from the date of the prop-
erty settlement agreement until the date of decedent's 
death is in issue, and the Court states the following: 
"The trial Court found Elizabeth M. Burgart, 
the first wife, had a vested right in the entire pro-
ceeds of the policy determined on the date of 
Burgart's death rather than on the property set-
tlement agreement. The Court's findings is sup-
ported by the terms of the agreement and by 
evidence at trial. Mr. Burgart agreed not to 
provide a set amount of life insurance but to 
maintain specific policies without changing their 
coverage. The Pacific Mutual Coverage was not 
for a set amount but was for the variable amount 
depending upon income . . . We must assume, 
absent contrary evidence, Mr. Burgart knew of 
the benefit escalation clause and contracted with 
reference to it." (Emphasis Added) 
As has been stated before, the Equitable Life As-
surance Policy No. 12560 was a variable policy with an 
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escalation clause dependent upon the decendent's salary. 
I t was the same policy that had been in the hands of 
the decedent from the very inception of his employment 
with Mountain Bell and remained the exact same policy 
until the time of his death. Both the decedent and Re-
spondent were aware of the policy, it's terms and con-
ditions and contracted accordingly. The Colorado Court 
of Appeals has held in a case very similar in point a 
similar holding, as did the California Court of Appeals, 
wherein the Colorado Court in Lillian Newton v. Steven 
Newton and Larree Newton, Colo. App., 472 P2d 718 
(1970), stated the following: 
"The face value of Cecil's [husband] coverage 
under the policy was $3,000.00 more at the time 
of his death than it was on the date the agree-
ment was executed. Lillian [second wife] con-
tends that since the parties had only the lessor 
amount in mind when the agreement was signed, 
the difference should belong to her as the bene-
ficiary of record at Cecil's death. We find no 
merit in this argument. The policy involved with 
the group life insurance policy in which the com-
pany, Westinghouse Electric, pays the entire 
premium for all eligible employees. The amount 
of coverage on each employee varied according 
to his salary so that, as his salary increased, so 
did his coverage under the policy. Under these 
circumstances the beneficiary who was entitled 
to the benefits takes them in their entirety, not-
withstanding the fact that there was an increase 
in the coverage since the decedent's designation 
of that beneficiary." 
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The Respondent is aware of only one case in which 
a jurisdiction has held that the second wife should have 
the increase in value in a life insurance policy, which 
case has been cited by the Appellant in White v. Mich-
igan Life Insurance Co., 43 Mich. App. 653, 204 N.W. 
2d 772 (1972). The Respondent contends that the 
White v. Michigan Life, supra, case is distinguished 
from the case before the Court at this time in that the 
Michigan Court was compelled to act under a statute 
under which the Utah Court has no similar or corres-
ponding statute in which to require it to give a decision. 
The Michigan statute creates a statutory presumption 
that any increased insurance proceeds would go to the 
estate of the decedent unless a divorie decree specifically 
designates to whom the increase should go. This ob-
viously is not the case before the Court at this time and 
should not be binding inasmuch as the decedent and 
Respondent contracted for the policy provided for the 
Respondents, fully aware of the possibility of an "ex-
pectancy" and that the escalation clause of the contract 
could very possibly increase inasmuch as it had during 
the course of their marriage up to the time of the di-
vorce. Under the terms of the White v. Michigan Life 
case, that decision turned on testimony of the parties 
involved as to their consent and satisfaction with less 
than the full amount of the policy and other testimony 
concerning conditions and terms of the divorce decree. 
In the case before the Court at this time, there is no 
transcript of any proceedings or any other testimony 
given, and in view of that lack of evidence as to the 
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circumstances and factual situation involved, the Court 
must rely upon the Property Settlement Stipulation 
entered into by the parties and the Divorce Decree that 
incorporated that settlement. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents would respectfully submit to the Court 
in conclusion that the Appellants' argument in Point I 
be denied on the assumption and basis that the Property 
Settlement Stipulaion in the Divorce Decree in the in-
stant case is straight forward and unambiguous. I t 
should be upheld on the basis that it is a contractual ob-
ligation of the decedent and that as such, it is binding 
and enforceable, and that it has the added authority of 
being incorporated as an Order of the Court. The Court 
in that instance had jurisdiction under Utah law under 
Section 30-3-5, Utar Code Annotated (1953), as 
amended (1973), which statute has been interpreted by 
this Court recently in Travelers v. Lewis, supra, and 
that the facts and circumstances of this case are not 
unique to take the instant case from within the purview 
of the Travelers v. Lewis case. The Respondents have 
distinguished the cases used by the Appellants in sup-
port of their argument under Point I, and believe that 
they are factually distinguishable from the instant case 
before the Court. The nature and terms of the instant 
case are straight forward. The decedent died intestate 
without any appreciable assets in his estate, that the 
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Respondent, Deborah Jean Moffit, would receive noth-
ing by way of an inheritance from her father, the de-
cedent, and that to protect her from such a contingency, 
the Respondent, Barbara Jean Madsen, and the deced-
ent entered into a contractual obligation at the time of 
the divorce to provide security for that veiy happening, 
and that was done by providing the insurance proceeds 
through Mountain Bell and Equitable. Therefore, those 
proceeds should be given to the Respondents in accord-
ance with the contract (Property Settlement Stipula-
tion), that was affirmed by the lower Court. 
In Point I I , the Appellants suggest that the in-
creased valuation of the insurance policy should go to 
the second wife and Appellant, Arlene C. Moffit. The 
Respondents feel that the better rule of law is that the 
interest given by the decedent at the time of the divorce 
from the Respondent, Barbara Jean Madsen, created a 
'Vested equitable interest" rather than a mere "expect-
ancy" of an inchoate gift. 
The factual circumstances surrounding the instant 
case before the Court provides the basis for the Re-
spondents' assertion to the Court that not only should 
the insurance policy proceeds be awarded to the Re-
spondents but also any increase in the policy. We have 
contracting parties, the Respondent, Barbara Jean Mad-
sen, and the decedent, entering into a Property Settle-
ment Stipulation, mentioning a particular life insur-
ance policy without any designation as to amount or 
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limitation. The parties understood that the proceeds of 
the policy would be for a variable amount based upon 
the annual gross receipt of the decedent at the time of 
his death and that the policy had an escalation clause 
in it. There was a risk taken by the Respondent that 
in fact the decedent's salary might not increase, in fact, 
it could decrease. Secondly, the decedent died intestate 
without any assets in his estate. The Respondent, Deb-
orah Jean Moffit, is left without any assets and the 
normal sustenance and help that a father normally gives 
his child is thereby terminated. The decedent and Re-
spondent, Barbara Jean Mdasen, contracted to provide 
for that contingency and in fact they have done so, and 
that to abrogate that insurance policy and the total bene-
fits thereunder from being received by the Respondent 
is to violate the intentions of the parties, the contract 
in which they entered into, the resulting Court order 
and the equities presented by the facts of record. 
Respectfully submitted, 
H O L L I S S. H U N T of 
D U R H A M , SWAN & H U N T 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Respondents 
510-Ten Broadway Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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